Scorecasting - Part 1

Scorecasting is a book questioning conventions in sports and backing up the questions with statistical examples written by Tobias J. Moskowitz and L. Jon Wertheim. It is a great book and I recommend it to everyone that is interested in sports and in statistics. Jon Wertheim is a writer for ESPN, covering tennis, the NBA and mixed martial arts since 1997. This is his 6th book. Toby Moskowitz is in the finacial economics field. In 2007, he was announced as the leading financer under the age of 40 by the American Finance Association. He is a faculty member at Booth in Chicago and his work can be found here.


The book starts off with some controversy. Referees swallow their whistles with the game on the line, and this is what fans want. At first this sounds terrible, but once you think about it, it's actually pretty good. In the NFL, how often this season has a game had a pass interference late in a game and you just wanted to scream at the TV. How about Indianapolis and Houston, week 15. Houston should win that game, yet a borderline pass interference call leaves the viewer with a bad taste in their mouth. In the NHL, we want the players to decide the games. It is difficult to get a penalty in the end of a game and only clear infractions are generally called. The NBA is likewise, fans do not want to want to see Lebron James hit two free throws win 0.6 seconds left, they want to see Derek Fisher hit a buzzer beater with 0.3 seconds left. Everyone remembers Derek Fisher hitting that shot. When you type in Derek Fisher, it is the top hit all these years later and it will be remembered for many more years. Sports is about memorable moments and players make memorable moments, not officials. You hear what is a penalty in the first period should be a penalty in the third period, but should it always be the case?



Coaches follow convention. It's easier and when it doesn't work, no one asks any questions, no one says, what was that coach doing. In football, coaches make choices that actually decrease their odds of winning. Kicking the ball in most cases actually decreases your odds of winning, yet if the New England Patriots do not punt the ball on 4th and 2, they get thrashed in the media, even if they took the odds by not punting. 


Scenario 1: "Play it safe" and punt: If the Pats punted the ball, the expected net punt would be 38 yards, leaving the Colts with the ball at their own 34. Based on historical data, the Colts would score a touchdown approximately 30% of the time (one could argue that we might expect the Colts to be more successful than the average team).

Scenario 2: Take the "risk" and go for it: If the Patriots converted the 4th down try, they could kneel on the ball and run the clock out. This would happen 60% of the time based on historical data (just as we did above with the Colts, one could also argue that we might expect the Pats to be more successful than the average team in converting on 4th down).

If the Pats failed to make the 1st down, the Colts would get the ball at the New England 28 with two minutes left, a position where teams score 53% of the time. In this case, the Patriots would still win 47% of the time. Combining these two probabilities leads to New England winning 79% of the time by going for it on 4th down.

60% + (47% * .40) = 78.85

Thus, playing it safe would lead to a new England victory 70% of the time, whereas "taking the risk" would actually not be a statistical risk, but rather a wise decision that would lead to a victory nearly 79% of the time.

Coaches need to be able to go outside the box and try new things. It takes a special coach, like Belichick to have courage to try something like that in a big game, but he trusted his statistics. There must be opportunities in all kinds of sports out their like this one and they are just waiting for a coach to come along and find them. I myself cannot wait for the day when that happens.

Michael Snow

"A rare combination of terrific storytelling and unconventional thinking. I love this book." - Steven D. Levitt (co-author of Freakonomics)